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others recently decided,1 9 is a distinct advance in the development of
the law.
The Immigration Department, as a governmental agency, has a
dual purpose. It must correctly decide the case as between the litigants, and further, its determination must subserve the public interest,
which it is charged with protecting.20 It is for the latter reason that
such administrative agencies have not been held bound by the strict
rules of evidence. 2 ' Since it is their duty to investigate, they should
be free to receive both judicially competent and incompetent evidence.
Nevertheless, in receiving hearsay evidence in the nature of blood test
results, the relators are entitled to due process. It would therefore
appear that the limitations imposed by the Lee Kum Hoy and Dong
Wing Ott cases are justifiable and necessary implementations of the
"fair play" concept of the due process clause.

ANTI-TRusT-CoNscIous PARALLELISM-INSUFFIClENT BASIS
FOR DIRECTED VEWICT.-Plaintiff, a motion picture exhibitor in suburban Baltimore, brought an action against defendants, moving picture producers and distributors, for violation of the anti-trust laws.'
In moving for a directed verdict, plaintiff contended that defendants
uniformly refused plaintiff the privilege of showing "first-run" pictures, and restricted such exhibits to downtown Baltimore theatres.
No direct evidence of an illegal agreement was shown. The same
defendants had previously been adjudicated guilty of conspiracy under
the anti-trust laws.2 The Supreme Court, in affirming a denial of
the motion, held that consciously parallel business behavior, even
taken in conjunction with the prior adverse decrees, is not conclusive
proof of a conspiracy in violation of the anti-trust laws. Theatre
Enterprises,Inc. v. ParamountFilm Distributing Corp., 74 Sup. Ct.
257 (1954).
Conspiracy, at common law, has generally been defined as an
agreement by two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a
lawful act by unlawful means.3 In anti-trust litigation, however, the
19 See Wong Yoke Sing v. Dulles, 116 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) ; Chin
Kwong
Hing v. Dulles, Civil No. 14,980-HW, S.D. Cal., Oct. 5, 1953.
20
See DAvIs, AD)mNIsTRVIm LAW 453 (1951).
21 Ibid.
126 STAT. 209, 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 15 (1946) (Sherman Act: made

criminal any conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce and allowed treble
damages to parties injured thereby); 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26
(1946) (Clayton Act: granted injunctive relief to interested parties).
2 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
3See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893); Common-
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conspiracy is regarded as the relationship created by an unlawful

agreement rather than the agreement itself.4 Basic differences exist
between conspiracy in anti-trust law and criminal conspiracy in the
usual sense. In the ordinary criminal conspiracy, intent to commit
the wrongful act must be proven; r in anti-trust cases, intent to restrain trade need not be shown.6 Furthermore, in suits under the
Sherman Act,7 unlike prosecutions for criminal conspiracy under federal law,8 there need be no allegation of an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy. The typical criminal conspiracy is concerned with
acts which are unlawful in themselves.9 This differs fundamentally
from conspiracy in anti-trust legislation, where the acts which the
agreement envisions may be perfectly innocent if done singly, and it
is only the conspiracy to do them which renders them illegal. 1
The phrase "conscious parallelism" refers, in anti-trust litigation,
to the practice of conducting similar businesses in a uniform manner,
the directors of each business being aware that the others are pursuing the same course. The natural effect of such harmonious activity

is to eliminate competition among the participating businesses, and to
restrain trade generally."
As long ago as 1914, the Supreme Court had alluded to the inference of a conspiracy from purely circumstantial evidence as
wealth v. Dyer, 243 Mass. 472, 138 N.E. 296, 303, cert. denied, 262 U.S. 751
(1923); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Metc.) 111, 125 (1842).
4See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910) (conspiracy defined by Mr. Justice Holmes as "a partnership in criminal purposes") ; United
States v. General Electric Co., 40 F. Supp. 627, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
5 Mazurosky v. United States, 100 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1939); Landen v.
United States, 299 Fed. 75 (6th Cir. 1924); Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290
Mass. 125, 194 N.E. 905 (1935); Odneal v. State, 117 Tex. Cr. App. 97, 34
S.W.2d 595 (1931).
6United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Universal Milk Bottle
Serv. v. United States, 188 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1951); see Addyston Pipe &
Steel7 Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 234 (1899).
See Nash v. United States 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913); United States v.
Great A. & P. Co., 137 F.2d 499, 463 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 783
(1943) ; Lamar v. United States, 260 Fed. 561, 563 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 250
U.S. 673 (1919).
821 STAT. 4 (1879), 18 U.S.C. §371 (1946), United States v. Reichert,
32 Fed. 142 (C.C.D. Cal. 1887); see Hyde v. United. States, 225 U.S. 347,
359 (1912).
9 State v. Parker, 114 Conn. 354, 158 Atl. 797 (1932) ; State v. Continental
Purchasing Co., 119 N.J.L. 257, 195 AUt. 827 (Sup. Ct.), affd nem., 121 N.J.L.
76, 1 A.2d 377 (1938); Commonwealth v. Mack, 111 Pa. Super. 494, 170 Atl.
429 (1934). In New York the acts must be criminal. See People v. Zittel,
114 Misc. 33, 186 N.Y. Supp. 648 (Gen. Sess. 1920).
20 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) ; see American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); United States V. Reading Co.,
226 U.S. 324, 357 (1912); United States v. Great A. & P. Co , supre note 7
at 464.
11 For a discussion of conscious parallelism see Rahl, Conspiracy and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 44 IL.. L. Rnv. 743, 755-762 (1950).
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"elementary." 12 In the major anti-trust cases prior to World War
II, however, there was generally a considerable amount of direct
evidence upon which such a finding could be predicated.13 In later
years, the amount of direct evidence required was permitted to
dwindle to a bare minimum, and finally to disappear completely. In
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,1 4 a finding of a conspiracy
as a matter of law among moving picture distributors was based on
their parallel behavior, in that each distributor entered into a separate
conspiracy with the same exhibitor. 5 In 1946, an illegal agreement
to suppress competition in the tobacco industry was found because
of the defendants' uniformity of action, although virtually no direct
evidence was adduced. 16 In 1948, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a conspiracy existed to maintain high prices in the steel
conduit industry, 17 although the evidence consisted almost solely of
the uniform adherence of the defendants to a base point pricing
12 See Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612
(1914). See also Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co., 72 F.2d 236 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 589 (1934), where it was held that a jury is entitled to consider circumstantial evidence in civil anti-trust suits.
23 See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) (formal agreement among railroads to fix rates); Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (shares in competing railroads transferred
to holding company); Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, supra
note 12 (retail trade association with express purpose of publishing blacklists
of wholesalers); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S.
377 (1921) (express plan to limit production of lumber); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing agreement
". .. based almost entirely on unequivocal testimony or undisputed contents
of exhibits. . .

."

Id. at 177).

14306 U.S. 208 (1939).

15 "It taxes credulity to believe that the several distributors would ...

have

accepted . . . with substantial unanimity such far-reaching changes in their
business methods without some understanding that all were to join, and we
reject as beyond the range of probability that it was the result of mere chance."
Id. at 223. The pattern of inferring a horizontal conspiracy from a series of
proven vertical conspiracies has recurred. See United States v. Masonite Corp.,
316 U.S. 265 (1942) ; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131
(1948).
16 See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
17 Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948),
aff'd mem., 336 U.S. 956 (1949). Professor Rahl regards this case as establishing conscious parallelism as the law in Federal Trade Commission cases.
See Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 IL. L. Rv. 743, 761 (1950).
This evaluation is applicable only to the unfair competition count of the action.
There was some direct evidence offered in proof of the conspiracy count. See
Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, supra at 180. As far back as 1945
this circuit had apparently espoused conscious parallelism, but the case had
been reversed on another point. Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 150 F2d
877 (7th Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 327 U.S. 251 (1946). This court
has been liberal in allowing inferences of a conspiracy to be drawn although
little or no direct evidence exists, in Federal Trade Commission cases. See
Fort Howard Paper Co. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1946); Milk and
Ice Cream Can Institute v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1946); United States
Maltsters Ass'n v. FTC, 152 F2d 161 (7th Cir. 1945).

19541

RECENT DECISIONS

system.' 8 The Supreme Court, in 1951, once again sustained a conspiracy finding on virtually no other evidence than the strikingly

harmonious behavior of "competitors."'
In view of this willingness to uphold conspiracy findings, it is

not surprising that the theory was advanced that the "res ipsa
loquitur" concept would eventually be applied in anti-trust conspiracy
cases.20 Thus, defendants would bear the burden of tracing their
parallel behavior to a cause other than an illegal agreement.
21
Finally, in Milgram v. Loew's, Inc.,
which bore a striking

factual resemblance to the principal case, consciously parallel activity
was held to be a sufficient basis upon which a conspiracy under the
Sherman Act could be inferred. In the case under discussion, however, plaintiff sought a directed verdict on the basis of consciously
parallel behavior and the additional circumstance of the prior adverse

decrees. By refusing to elevate the doctrine to such probative dignity,
the Court halted the apparent trend toward the complete abandonment
of the element of agreement in anti-trust conspiracies.
The Court would have done a disservice to have decided otherwise. If the concept of "conspiracy" is to retain its utility as a legal

term, it cannot be so extended in scope that in the very attempt to
give it new meaning, we render it meaningless for lack of precision.
Basically, the problem is a legislative one.

That is, rather than have

the courts distort the meaning of the statute by extending the specified classes of condemned activity, so as to include harmful parallel

behavior, Congress should amend the Sherman Act, so as to separate
innocent from baneful business practice. The problem is not without

difficulty. Since intent to restrain trade is not a necessary element
in conspiracy under the anti-trust laws,2 2 the danger exists that we
would fall into the logical fallacy of "post hoc, ergo propter hoc," if
consciously uniform activity were to be banned as such. A possible
1s Base point pricing is a method of equalizing the price of a commodity
throughout the nation. A base city, or cities, is selected, and each manufacturer, wherever situated, adds to his price a "ghost freight" charge, i.e., what
it would have cost to freight the product from the base to the place of sale,
had this been done. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
19 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951), reversing
182 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1950). The only direct evidence of an agreement was
a chance remark by a Calvert official that Calvert "had to go along with
Seagram"
on its selling policy. Id., 182 F.2d at 231.
20
Rahl, supra note 17, at 758. Placing this burden upon the defendant had
been judicially denounced in 1946. See Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. FTC,
157 F.2d 533, 544 (7th Cir. 1946), rev'd on other grounds sub nora. FTC v.
Cement Institute, supra note 18.
21 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952). In dissenting, Judge Hastie roundly denounced conscious parallelism, asserting that
it eliminated the element of agreement hitherto necessary in establishing a
conspiracy. Id. at 587, 590-591.
22 See note 6 supra.
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solution would be to amend the statute to require a showing of either
conspiracy, as is now the rule, or parallel behavior plus the intent
to restrain commerce.

CORPORATIONS-DERIVATIVE ACTION-BENEFICIAL OWNER REQUIRED TO POST SECURITY.-In a derivative action against a Delaware

corporation and its directors, plaintiff sought damages for fraud, mismanagement and waste, and rescission of certain agreements. A
Pennsylvania statute required a holder of less than five per cent of
any class of outstanding stock to post security for reasonable litigation
expenses.' Defendant moved pursuant to this statute, to require the
plaintiff, the conceded beneficial holder of five per cent of stock, to
furnish such security. In granting the motion, the Court held that
by holder of five per cent, the statute meant holder of record. Murdock v. Follansbee Steel Corp., 114 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
Since all shareholders are, in the final analysis, damaged by a
wrong to the corporation, and since individual suits would be impractical, equity afforded relief in the form of a stockholders' derivative suit.2 This remedy was long the chief deterrent to fraudulent
corporate management. 3 The suit is available only where a cause of
action has accrued to the corporation, which, after proper demand,
the directors fail to prosecute. 4 Although damages, in the first instance, inure to the corporation,5 they may benefit the shareholder
by way of increased dividends and serve to protect his investment. 6
Instances of abuse, however, were not uncommon.7 Unfounded
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (Purdon, 1953). The Pennsylvania statute
was applied under the rule of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 554 (1949), wherein a similar New Jersey statute was applied to a
Delaware corporation, in a derivative action brought in New Jersey.
2 See Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 150 App. Div. 298, 302, 303,
134 N.Y. Supp. 635, 638, 639 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138
(1912); Hichens v. Congreve, 4 Russ. 562, 576, 38 Eng. Rep. 917, 922 (Ch.

1828); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 145 (Rev. ed. 1946).

3 See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra note 1 at 548.
4 See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881).
5See Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N.Y. 257, 264, 179 N.E. 487, 489 (1932);
Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Metc.) 371, 385 (1847).
6See BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 222 n.3 (1933).
7 "A stockholder's derivative suit may be a useful agency or it may be

grossly abused for purposes far removed from any desire to do a service to
the corporation represented." Weinberger v. Quinn, 264 App. Div. 405, 409,
35 N.Y.S.2d 567, 572 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd mere., 290 N.Y. 635, 49 N.E.
2d 131 (1943); see Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 83 Misc. 340, 343,
144 N.Y. Supp. 801, 804 (Sup. Ct. 1913), aff'd, 168 App. Div. 483, 154 N.Y.
Supp. 54 (2d Dep't 1915), aff'd inen., 222 N.Y. 673, 119 N.E. 1036 (1918).

